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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-POWER OF NATIONAL BANK TO PLEDGE ASSETS-
EFFECT OF ULTRA VIRES AGREEMENT-Plaintiff county deposited county funds
in a state bank under a tri-party agreement whereby defendant National bank
placed certain bonds with state bank as security for the deposit. State bank
deposited the funds in National bank. The money was to be withdrawn by county
from state bank, and by state bank from defendant National Bank only upon
surrender of a proportionate amount of the pledged securities. In violation of
the agreement defendant National bank withdrew all the bonds while a balance
remained to the credit of county in state bank. After state bank closed plaintiff
sought recovery of this balance, alleging that defendant was guilty of a breach of
trust in so withdrawing the pledged securities. Held, that though the agreement
as regarded defendant National bank was ultra 71ires, defendant was accountable
for the funds, as the res of a "constructive or resulting trust". Florida Nat.
Bank v. County of Okeechobee, 157 So. 570 (Fla. 1934).
A National bank lacks the power to pledge its assets to secure a deposit of
private funds.' Prior to an amendment 2 of the National Banking Act 3 a
National bank had no authority to pledge its assets as security for a deposit even
of public funds.4 Since in the instant case the funds were deposited under an
agreement prior to the amendment, the court's holding that defendant National
bank had no power to pledge its assets as security for the deposit in question was
correct. If the transaction be viewed as an agreement for the guaranty of funds
in state bank, rather than as security for a deposit coming to itself as a banking
institution, the agreement would still be open to the plea of ultra vires, since a
National bank has no authority to act as guarantor of another's obligation.5 Con-
ceding that the agreement was ultra vires, and the pledge unenforceable, a more
difficult question concerns the effect of such a transaction. Some courts have
held that under such an ultra vires agreement the depositor may recover in full
even as against the receiver of an insolvent bank.6 Others, recognizing equal
treatment of depositors as the reason for the rule inhibiting the giving of security
to certain depositors,7 have allowed the receiver to plead ultra vires in denial of
i. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245 (1934) ; see (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv.
54, for discussion of private deposit cases.
2. 46 STAT. 8O9 (193o), 12 U. S. C. A. § go (1934).
3. 13 STAT. 99 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. § I et seq. (1927).
4. City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934).
5. It would seem to follow that if a National bank has no authority to pledge its assets
to secure one of its own depositors, it must lack the power to pledge its assets to secure a
depositor of another bank. For the general proposition that National banks may not act as
guarantors of another's obligation, see I MORSE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 65.
6. Recovery in full is based on the doctrine of estoppel. French v. School District, 223
Mo. App. 53, 7 S. W. (2d) 415 (1928) (public funds) ; State Bank of Commerce v. Stone,
261 N. Y. I75, 184 N. E. 750 (1933) (private funds). See Ainsworth v. Kruger, 8o Mont.
468, 479, 26o Pac. 1055, 1059 (1927) (public funds) ; City of Williston v. Ludowese, 53 N.
D. 797, 8o9, 208 N. W. 82, 87 (1926) (public funds).
7. "To permit the pledge would be inconsistent with many provisions of the National
Bank Act which are designed to ensure, in case of disaster, uniformity in the treatment of de-
positors and a ratable distribution of assets." Brandeis, J., in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff,
291 U. S. 245, 255 (1934).
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the depositor's claim to a preference" Where the defendant is a solvent bank,
courts are not in accord as to whether it may plead ultra vires as a defense to an
action founded on an agreement that has been executed by the other party.9 On
strict principles of Trusts law there would appear to be no ground for construct-
ing a trust where-as in the principal case-there is an absence of fraudulent
misconduct on the part of the bank.10 Aside from Trusts concepts, 1 whether a
solvent bank should be allowed to disclaim all liability on the ground that the
agreement was beyond its powers depends on whether the equities of its stock-
holders-and possibly of the mass of its depositors 1"-are to be preferred to
those of the particular depositor." Where the funds in question are public
moneys it is understandable that a court should balance the equities in favor of
the public body. At the same time, the conflicting equities might best be resolved
by limiting the solvent bank's liability in the instant case to the extent of the
actual benefit it received from the transaction, depositor retaining a claim for the
balance as a general creditor against the insolvent bank.14
BILLS AND NOTES-FICTITIOUS PAYEES-EFFECT OF Co-SIGNER'S LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE THAT PAYEE Is FICTITIOUS PERSON IN DETERMINING WHETHER
CHECK IS PAYABLE TO BEARER-The duty of signing checks and supervising
their preparation was imposed on X, head of plaintiff corporation's accounting
department. Although other officers of plaintiff were also required to sign each
check, they relied entirely on X's statement that it was properly drawn. X pre-
pared and signed several checks payable to the order of fictitious persons, and
after procuring the necessary co-signatures, forged the payees' indorsements and
kept the proceeds of negotiation. Defendant bank paid the checks and debited
plaintiff's account, whereupon plaintiff brought this action to recover the amount
deducted. The bank defended under section 9 (3) of the N. I. L. providing:
"The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." Held,
that plaintiff could not recover, since X was "the person making it so payable"
under the Act. Goodyear Tire Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 37 P. (2d) 483 (Cal.
App. 1934).
8. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245 (1934) (private funds) ; City of Marion
v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262 (1934) (public funds) ; Smith v. B. & 0. R. R., 56 F. (2d) 799
(C. C. A. 3d, 1932) (private funds); Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W. 236
(1927) (public funds).
9. The earlier Supreme Court decisions, regarding the ultra vires transactions as void
and incapable of "ratification," held that .the bank was never "estopped" to plead lack of
power. California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362 (1897) ; Concord First National Bank
v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 364 (1899). More recent decisions have held that where the bank has
received a benefit from the transaction it is under a duty to return it to the contracting party.
Citizens Cent. Nat. Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196 (igio) ; First Nat. Bank v. Mott Iron
Works, 258 U. S. 240 (1922).
io. Plaintiff would also have to prove an identifiable res. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff,
291 U. S. 245 (1934) ; I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 166 et seq.
i. The court in the instant case appeared to be unconcerned with technicalities, merely.
stating that the funds were impressed with a "constructive or resulting trust". Principal
case at 573.
12. Depositors might be adversely affected in some instances though the bank is solvent;
it is conceivable that allowing recovery in full might in itself cause the bank to become in-
solvent.
13. The depositor stands in the position of having parted with his money on the strength
of an agreement without which it is doubtful whether he would have made the deposit in the
particular bank which is now claiming that the security agreement is not binding.
14. See cases cited note 9, supra.
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In applying section 9 () of the N. I. L.1 to instruments signed by agents
having authority to draw negotiable paper, courts have (I) imputed to the prin-
cipal the agent's knowledge that the payee was fictitious,2 or (2) held that "person
making it so payable" referred, not to the nominal maker (the principal), but to
the agent who drew the instrument.' Since an agent in such cases is usually
defrauding his employer, application of the first theory often involves a disregard
of the rule against charging a principal with knowledge possessed by an agent
who is acting adversely to the principal's interest.4 On the other hand, the second
theory has been definitely limited to actual signers by decisions that an agent who
merely prepares a list of payees is not "the person making it so payable", even
where he in fact determines that the payee of an instrument shall be fictitious by
fraudulent preparation of the list.5 This preference of a technical over a factual
test doubtless arises out of a desire to avoid extended inquiry into the duties of
numerous corporate officials. 6 In the instant case, the court proceeded on the
second theory ; 7 but in reasoning that X was in fact "the person making it so
payable" because he had control over the department in which the checks were
prepared, the court disregarded the principle behind the decisions which limit the
rule's application to an actual signer. Since certainty is of paramount importance
in the law of commercial paper, it would seem better on principle to adopt an
easily applied, though technical, definition which interprets "when such fact was
known to the person making it so payable" as meaning "when such fact was
known to the person or persons whose signatures were necessary to create the
instrument". In so far as the present decision introduces a variable element by
requiring an inquiry in every case as to the part played by each signing official,
the result reached is unfortunate.
BONDS-CONSTRUCTION OF REFERENCE IN CORPORATE BONDS SECURED BY
TRUST DEED TO TRUST DEED CONTAINING "No-ACTION" CLAUSE-Plaintiff, an
individual bondholder of defendant corporation, sued for payment of his matured
bonds and interest coupons. A trust deed containing a corporate mortgage se-
i. This section is in substance declaratory of the commmon law. Gibson v. Minet,
I H. B1. 569 (H. L. 179o) (in which the court reasoned that since the maker knew no
formal chain of title could be traced through a fictitious payee, it was only just to presume
that a bill payable to bearer was intended). Cf. BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, 45 & 46 VICT.
c. 61, §7 (3) (88z) (providing, "Where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person
the bill may be treated as payable to bearer"). Under this act the maker need not know
that the payee is fictitious. Bank of England v. Vagliano [1891] A. C. lo7. Under both
English and American versions it is possible that the bill would be enforceable without
indorsement. See McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1902) 5o Ame. L. REG.
437 at 448; CHAL-aERS, BILLs OF EXCHANGE (9th ed. 1927) 27.
2. American Hominy Co. v. National Bank of Decatur, 294 Ill. 223, 128 N. E. 391
(i92O) ; Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (19o8); see
American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 114, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034,
lO4i (1932); cf. Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 14o N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894).
3. Mueller and Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S. W. 465 (1920); cf.
American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 25 S. W. (2d) 545, 549 (Mo. App.
1930).
4. 2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1815.
5. City of St. Paul v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 15, Minn. 485, 187 N. W. 516 (1922);
American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034
(1932) ; Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Nat. City Bank, 2o8 App. Div. 83, 203 N. Y. Supp. 32 (ist
Dep't I924).
6. See American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 25 S. W. (2d) 545, 550
(Mo. App. 193o); BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INsTRUm ENTs LAW (5th ed. 1932) 174.
7. Principal case at 486.
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cured the bond issue. The bonds in suit on their face bore language purporting
to incorporate by reference all the provisions of the trust deed,' one of which
was an express "no-action" clause.2 Held, that plaintiff might sue individually,
since the general reference on the face of the bond to the provisions of the trust
deed may not "reasonably be said to incorporate therein . . . the no-action
clause", the reference indicating merely "that the obligor was speaking solely of
the security". Ossuianza v. Wengler & Mandell, Inc., i93 N. E. 123 (Ill. 1934).
Usually the legal consequences of "no-action" clauses in contemporaneously
executed trust deeds have been determined-as in the instant case-by the insti-
tution of suit by individual corporate bondholders on bonds 3 or interest coupons,,
although suits on mortgage securities held by trustees under trust agreements
have occurred.' In the former type of litigation the issue has generally been the
negotiability of the primary obligation.6 However, the instant case squarely raises
the point of construction of the reference in the bonds to the trust deed: "whether
there is in the bond language which may reasonably be said to incorporate therein,
by reference, the no-action clause of the trust deed." 7 For that reason decisions
concerning the incident of negotiability of bonds in connection with "no-action"
clauses in trust deeds should seemingly have had no influence in swaying the
court. Yet in fact authorities of this nature were deemed controlling.8 The real
rationale for the court's arbitrary and rigid construction of the bond reference
perhaps might lie in the prevalent desire of courts, because of the economic stress
of the times, to grasp even minutiae in an endeavor to favor bona fide holders of
i. The language on the face of the bond was: "For a description of the mortgaged prop-
erty and the nature and extent of the security reference is made to said trust deed, to all of
the provisions of which this bond..nd each coupon hereto attached are subject, with the same
effect as if said trust deed were herein fully set forth." Instant case at 124.
2. The "no-action" clause set forth in the trust deed was: "Every holder of any of the
bonds hereby secured (including pledgees) accepts the same subject to the express under-
standing . . . that every right of action, whether at law or in equity . . . under this
indenture, is vested exclusively in the trustee....." Instant case at 124.
3. Watson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 169 App. Div. 663, i55 N. Y. Supp. 8o8 (Ist
Dep't 1915) ; General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 20o App. Div. 794,
193 N. Y. Supp. 9o3 (Ist Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216 (0923) ; Oster v.
Buildings Development Co., 213 Wis. 481, 252 N. W. i68 (934) (action by trustee to fore-
close trust deed pending when bondholder sues on his individual bonds and interest coupons).
4. Belleville Savings Bk. v. Mercantile Trust Co., 194 Ill. App. i75 (915) ; Rothschild
v. Rio Grande Western R. R., 84 Hun 103, 32 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Ist Dep't i895) ; Neivel Realty
Corp. v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 151 Misc. 737, 271 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Mun. Ct. 1934) ; cf.
Muren v. Southern Coal & Mining Co., 177 Mo. App. 6oo, i6o S. W. 835 (973); Romberg
v. Interstate Independent Tel. & Tel. Co., 200 Ill. App. 509 (i916).
5. Cf. Etna Steel & Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Ga. 232, 73 S. E. 8 (1911).
6. Pflueger v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bk., 351 Ill. 170, 184 N. E. 318 (1932) ; Men-
delson v. Realty Mortgage Corp., 257 Mich. 442, 241 N. W. 154 (1932) ; cf. Note (1928) 42
HARv. L. REV. 115, ii9. Recognition of negotiability and the allowance of individual action
on the primary obligation is the trend. (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 365, 366; Sturgis Nat. Bk. v.
Harris Trust & Savings Bk., 351 Ill. 465, 184 N. E. 589 (I933) ; cf. General Investment Co.
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 2oo App. Div. 794, 8oi, 193 N. Y. Supp. 903, 909 (Ist
Dep't 1922) ; Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., ii8 Misc. IH, 17,
193 N. Y. Supp. 892, 898 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Porte v. Polachek, I5O Misc. 891, 27o N. Y. Supp.
807 (Mun. Ct. 1934).
7. Instant case at 125. Cf. Crosthwaite v. Moline Plow Co., 298 Fed. 466, 468 (S. D.
N. Y. 1924) ; Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912, 915 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Gauss v.
Simon, 268 Ill. App. 196, 197 (1932).
8. Instant case at 126. Contra: Rudick v. Ulster & Delaware R. R., 147 Misc. 637, 263
N. Y. Supp. 498 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; cf. Belleville Savings Bk. v. Southern Coal & Mining Co.,
173 Ill. App. 250 (1912) ; Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilburn Corp., 47 F. (2d) 318 (S. D. N. Y.
1930) (trust agreement referred to in notes contained "no-action" clause, but did not relate
to any collateral security or mortgage to secure the notes).
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bonds of defaulting corporations." The result necessarily sweeps aside the mani-
fest reasons for inclusion of the "no-action" clause in the trust deed and the bond
reference thereto; namely, to protect the corporate debtor from multiplicity of
suits,o and "to insure that course of action with respect to the property of the
debtor which will best serve the interests of all the bondholders as a class." "1
Careful draftsmen of instruments containing restrictive provisions of the nature
involved herein may well regard this decision as indicative of a tendency which
courts might willingly follow-and therefore take pains to include the pertinent
provision formerly intended to be merely incorporated by reference.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION-LAw GOVERNING THE VALIDITY OF
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO CHECK BY FORGED INDORSEMENT-Federal government's
check was mailed to payee in Jugo-Slavia, where the payee's indorsement was
forged and the check negotiated to a bank which took in good faith, for value,
and without negligence. Under Jugo-Slavian law this passed to the transferee
good title to the check;' under the law of the District of Columbia the transfer
had no such effect.2 Upon receiving the check from the Jugo-Slavian bank by a
series of indorsements, defendant secured payment from the government. Upon
a subsequent discovery of the forgery, the government sued to recover the money
as improperly collected. Held, that the Jugo-Slavian law governed, and that
defendant should accordingly prevail. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York, 55 Sup. Ct. 221 (1934).
The instant case represents the first Supreme Court ruling on a compara-
tively new problem. Plaintiff urged that the question was one of interpretation
of the contract obligations of the government, and that since the check was both
drawn and payable in this country, a contrary decision should have been reached
under any of the violently conflicting views as to the law governing such obliga-
tions." However, the Court took the position that the obligation of the govern-
ment was to pay to the one holding legal title to the check, and that since the
transfer of title had occurred in a foreign country, the law of that jurisdiction
governed the validity of the transfer. This is in accord with the modern view
that the law of the situs of tangible personalty governs the transfer of interests
9. Cf. Sturgis Nat. Bk. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bk., 266 Ill. App. 199, 204 (1932)
("Such bonds should be construed most favorably to the purchasing public") ; Note (1927)
27 COL. L. REV. 443, 447. But cf. Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilburn Corp., 47 F. (2d) 318, 321
(S. D. N. Y. i93o) : "If it be thought nevertheless that restrictions like these should not be
countenanced, that each noteholder in a case like the present should be allowed to sue on his
obligation by consulting his own judgment alone, the remedy will come when buyers of cor-
porate obligations prove to be more discriminating and when the presence of conditions of this
sort will render the obligation unsaleable or unattractive in the market."
1o. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATE BONDS AND MORTGAGES (2d ed. 19o7)
§ 340 a; Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. REV. 443, 583; cf. Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilburn Corp., 47
F. (2d) 318, 320 (S. D. N. Y. I93O).
ii. Note (927) 27 CoL. L. R v. 443, 583; cf. Watson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 169
App. Div. 663, 676, 155 N. Y. Supp. 8W8, 817 (ist Dep't 1915).
i. This was conceded by the government. The same rule was adopted by the Hague Con-
vention of 1912. UNIFoRi LAW ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PRoi-nissoRy NOTES, art. 15.
2. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 22, § 24. This is the orthodox Anglo-American rule relating to
forged indorsements. See English BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, 45 & 46 VtcT., c. 61, § 24
(1882) ; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 23.
3. Precedence is variously given to the law of the place (I) of contracting, (2) of per-
formance, and (3) intended by the parties. For a discussion of this controversy with citation
of cases and articles see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 228 et seq.
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therein; 4 in treating an intangible in the same manner for this purpose, the court
was supported by adequate,5 but not mandatory,6 case authority, and by potent
critical opinion.' There is much to be said for the decision on grounds of policy
as well. An opposite rule would place upon foreign banks the risk of acquiring
valid title under our law. As has been suggested, such a situation would not be
conducive to harmonious commercial relationships." A caveat should be entered
that the holding will not necessarily govern a case in which the check is removed
from the jurisdiction without the consent of the maker.9 However, recognition
of the foreign law seems especially advisable where, as here, the maker by desig-
nating a foreign payee may be said to have voluntarily relinquished the protection
of the local law."0
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTROL OVER CURRENCY-POWER OF CONGRESS
TO NULLIFY THE GOLD CLAUSE IN PRIVATE OBLIGATIONs-Plaintiffs sought
judgment on bonds obligating defendants to pay in gold coin of the standard of
weight and fineness existing when the promise was made. Joint Resolution of
Congress, June 5, 1933, declared such clauses void and all obligations containing
them dischargeable in any current legal tender, dollar for dollar.1 Held (four
justices dissenting), that the Resolution was constitutional as an exercise of
Congress' power over currency. Aorrnan v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., U. S. L.
Week, February 19, 1935, at 543 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'g 265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E.
726 (1934).
In affirming judgment against the bondholders, the court concluded that
private contracts containing the gold clause were subject to variation by Con-
4. Id. at 345 et seq. The older view was that the law of the domicile of the owner was
controlling. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed. 1857) § 380 and cases cited.
5. Direction Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22 (1925)
(stock certificates) ; New York Trust Co. v. Island O:1 & Transport Co., 33 F. (2d) lO4 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1929) (same) ; Mackintosh v. Gibbs, 81 N. J. 577, 8o Atl. 554 (911) (promissory
notes) ; see Weissman v. Banque De Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488, 494, 173 N. E. 835, 837 (1930)
(check). It is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that intangibles are generally taxable
by the state of the owner's domicile only. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (193o) ; see
infra this issue, at 692.
6. A case heavily relied upon in defendant's brief is not necessarily decisive of the in-
stant case. In Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [19o5] I K. B. 677, where a foreign bill
was stolen from the payee and cashed at a Vienna bank by a forgery of the payee's indorse-
ment, the bank prevailed in an action of conversion by the payee, the court applying Austrian
law. However, a distinction is drawn in the Bills of Exchange Act between foreign and in-
land bills, English law governing the indorsement abroad of the latter. BILLS. OF EXCHANGE
ACT, 45 & 46 VicT., c. 61, § 72 (2) (1882). The instant case involved an inland bill, the check
being both drawn and payable in this country. While the case is thus technically distinguish-
able, its weight must be conceded.
7. See LORENZEN, CoNFLICr OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NOTES (1919) 139, 140;
RESTATEmAENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 262.
8. See Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 803, 813.
9. There is considerable controversy as to whether title to property taken out of the
jurisdiction without the owner's consent may be divested under the law of the state into which
it is brought. See Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927) 40
HARV. L. REV. 8o5; GooDRiCh, op. cit. supra note 3, at 351 et seq.
io. It is not entirely clear how much weight was given this factor by the court. "Here,
the rule is particularly applicable; for the Government, having made the check payable to one
therein described as resident in Jugo-Slavia and having mailed it to his Jugo-Slavia address,
must be deemed to have intended that it should be negotiated there, according to the law of
that country." Principal case at 224.
I. 48 STAT. 112, 31 U. S. C. A. 463 (1933).
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gress' exercise of its power to make the currency uniform.2  As was suggested
in a previous issue of this REVIEW, the result is supported by economic facts.'
If the legislature were powerless to condemn the use of gold as a standard of
exchange, its efforts toward establishing a uniform currency with government
notes as the basic unit would be ineffective.4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES-
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS-Pennsylvania statutes
provide that service upon an agent of non-resident individuals doing business
within the Commonwealth shall be of "like effect as though such writ or process
was served personally upon the principal." Written notice to defendants is
required." An agent of non-resident partners engaged in business in Pennsyl-
vania was served with summons in an action for an alleged tort arising from
conduct of the business within the state.2  Defendants appeared specially. Held,
that the service conferred jurisdiction, the statute authorizing it neither violating
"due process" 3 nor infringing defendants' "privileges and immunities". 4 Stoner
v. Higginson, I75 Atl. 527 (Pa. 1934).
The Pennsylvania court was not the first 5 to exorcise Flexner v. Farson6
by invoking Hess v. Pawloski.7 The former case held 8 that a state could not
acquire jurisdiction over non-resident individuals by service upon an agent,
merely from the circumstance of their doing business within the state. The Court
reasoned that since a state is not privileged to exclude a citizen 0 it may not exact
fulfillment of conditions as the price of admitting him. As to corporations, the
situation is otherwise; being capable of exclusion, 0 they enter only on such terms
2. Principal case at 547 et seq.
3. (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 88.
4. It has been said that nearly all corporate and public bonds in addition to numerous
personal obligations contain the gold clause. See BUSINESS WEEK, June 7, 1933, at 7. The
court emphasized the number of obligations in reasoning that their strict enforcement would
interfere with legislative control over currency. Principal case at 548.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193i) tit. 12, §§ 296, 297.
2. Neither the opinion nor the record on appeal discloses the nature of the alleged cause
of action other than its sounding in tort.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XIV.
4. Id. Art. IV, § 2; Amend. XIV.
5. The distinction of priority belongs to Iowa. A statute similar to the one involved in
the present case was sustained in Davidson v. Doherty, 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932),
91 A. L. R. 1327 (2934); Goodman v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 255 N. W. 667 (Iowa 2934).
6. 248 U. S. 289 (1gig). Accord: Caldwell v. Armour, I Pen. 545, 43 At. 517 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1899) ; Andrews Bros. v. McLanahan, 22o Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457 (927) ; Ca-
banne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 51o, 92 N. W. 462 (1902) ; Knox Bros. v. E. W. Wagner & Co., 141
Tenn. 348, 209 S. W. 638 (1919). But cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 735 (1877) ; Rau-
ber v. Whitney, 125 Ind. 216, 25 N. E. 186 (189o) ; Conkey v. Conder, 137 Ind. 441, 37 N. E.
32 (1893).
7. 274 U. S. 352 (1927), 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 93 (1927).
8. The quality of the holding has been challenged on the ground that the so-called agent
had ceased to be such at the time of service, and that the decision should have been put on that
basis. See instant case at 534; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within
a State (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 871, 890, 891; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists
(1926) 39 HAav. L. RPv. 563, 583.
9. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 18o (U. S. 1868) ; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418,
430 (U. S. 1870).
io. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. i868).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
as the state may dictate.11 The fact that conditions may be imposed even on
corporations which cannot be barred 12 was overlooked. The same Court had
previously held, as well, that a state could prohibit individuals from using its
highways until they authorize a state official to receive process for them in suits
arising from their automotive journey.13 Subsequently, in Hess v. Pawloski, the
Court sustained a statute which made actual authorization unnecessary, use of
the highways being deemed a sufficient appointment in itself.-4 In both cases the
requirement of "due process" was met by asserting the state's police power and
the alleged tendency of the legislation to promote careful driving. The "privileges
and immunities" clauses were held not violated since the statutes merely placed
non-residents on an equality with residents. The second view would also apply
to cases other than those arising from automobile accidents, especially since Penn-
sylvania subjects even residents to substitute service in counties where they do
business but do not reside.' 5 As for the "due process" clause, that would seem
to be satisfied by the provisions for notice and opportunity to defend; no greater
concession is allowed corporations who, like individuals, are under its protection."
Finally, the policy served is commendable. Residents of a state who give an-
other their patronage should not be forced to seek remedies against him in his
often remote forum. But the last word will remain with the United States
Supreme Court. It may limit Hess v. Pawloski to automobile cases or at best to
cases involving dangerous enterprises. Or it may, in extending its newer doc-
trine, overrule Flexner v. Farson expressly or by the familiar judicial distinguish-
ing process.1 7 Although the federal Court is without the prepossession in favor
of local interests which may be expected of state courts, it is to be hoped that the
latter course will be followed..
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INCREASE OF INADEQUATE VERDICT WITH DE-
FENDANT'S CONSENT INSTEAD OF GRANTING NEW TRIAL AS A VIOLATION OF
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT-Plaintiff was awarded a verdict which the trial
court considered inadequate. A new trial was ordered, conditioned on defend-
1i. Including the necessity of accepting substitute service. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French.
18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914) ;
Washington ex rel. Bond v. Superior Ct. of Washington, 289 U. S. 361 (1933). But "due
process" requires notice to the corporation and opportunity to defend. See St. Clair v. Cox,
lo6 U. S. 350, 356 (1882) ; Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 24 (1928).
12. Submission to substitute service may be required of a corporation which, being en-
gaged in interstate commerce, cannot be excluded. International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
13. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o (1916).
14. But such a statute which fails to provide for reasonable notice to defendants is in-
valid. Wuchter v. Piz2utti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193) tit. 12, § 29ia. So too Iowa. CODE (931) § 11079.
Kentucky, whose statute was held invalid in Flexner v. Farson, had no such law.
16. See note ii supra. But a state's jurisdiction is not broad enough to permit substitute
service in causes of action arising outside of the state or otherwise than from the conduct of
defendants' business. See Scott, supra note 8, 32 HARv. L. R., at 888 et seq. The Pennsyl-
vania statute is couched in such broad terms that it would seem to apply even to these situa-
tions. The statute, however, might well be held divisible, and constitutional insofar as it
relates to causes of action arising from the business and within the state. The instant court
predicated its holding on the finding that "'the cause of action arose out of a transaction of
defendants' business in Allegheny County'" (at 535).
17. Points of distinction have already been supplied by Scott, supra note 8, and by Culp,
Process in Ations Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State (934) 32 MICH.
L. REv. 9o9, 918, who have indicated various alternative grounds for the decision in Flexner
v. Farson. The fact remains, however, .that these were completely ignored in Mr. Justice
Holmes' opinion.
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ant's agreement to increased damages. Defendant having accepted the increased
judgment, plaintiff appealed from the denial of a motion for a new trial. Held
(four justices dissenting),1 that the failure to grant a new trial was a violation of
plaintiff's right to trial by jury under the seventh amendment. Dinick v. Schiedt.
55 Sup. Ct. 296 (1935).
The seventh amendment provides that the right to trial by jury shall be pre-
served and that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined than
according to the rules of the common law. The amendment has been interpreted
to refer to the common law as it was in 1791, when the amendment was adoptedA
But this does not mean that the same procedural forms must be retained. 3 The
increasing of inadequate verdicts by the court with the consent of the defendant
is a recent development, unknown in I79I. 4 The question therefore is whether
this practice represents a change of procedure or of substance. The practice of
remitting part of an excess verdict with the consent of the plaintiff, and denying
defendant a new trial, has been held not to be a violation of this amendment,5 and
so offered a close analogy which the Court, however, refused to follow.6 The
only satisfactory distinction made between the two practices was that the practice
of decreasing verdicts was to some extent in use at the time of the adoption of
the amendment.7 From the point of view of practical considerations, the case
involved a balancing of interests. On the one hand is the interest that everyone
shall have a right to a trial by jury, and on the other the great saving in time and
expense which would result from settlements without a retrial of cases in which
the damages were inadequate." As "procedure" had previously been given a
fairly broad interpretation in connection with this amendment,9 it appears that
the Court was not required to interpret the additur in the instant case as "sub-
stance".
I. Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, Roberts and McReynolds concurred in the
majority opinion. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo dissented.
2. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 350 (1898) ; Patton v. United States, 281 U. S.
276,288 (1930).
3. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. R., I65 U. S. 593 (897); Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 (i92o) ; Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283U. S. 494 (0931).-
4. Increased verdicts had been granted in England in mayhem cases, without the consent
of the defendant, in the distant past. The last case in which this action was taken was in 733.
See SAYER, LAW OF DAMAGES (1770) 13; Burton v. Baynes, Barne's Practice Cases 153
(733). At present neither a decrease nor an increase in the verdict by the courts is permit-
ted in England. See Watts v. Watts, [i9o5] A. C. xi5, 120.
5. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 13o U. S. 69 (1889); Gila Valley Ry. v.
Hall, 232 U. S. 94 (1914).
6. Instant case at 300: ".. it (the court) ever must be alert to see that a doubtful
precedent be not extended by mere analogy. .. ."
7. The Court also made the distinction that the remithur removes the excess part of the
verdict and that what remains had in fact been found by the jury; but that where the verdict
is too small the court is making a bald addition of something which in no sense may be said
to be included in the verdict. This distinction does not appear particularly important. In
each case the court is awarding a sum different from that fixed by the jury, and logically
there should not be any difference between the court's awarding a smaller sum and awarding
a larger sum.
8. See Note (934) 44 YAE L. J. 318; (934) Co- L. REv. 1551.
9. In Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. R., 165 U. S. 593 (897), it was
held that the court might require a special and a general verdict, and that where the special
and the general verdicts were in conflict, the court could give judgment on the special find-
ings, and was not required to grant a new trial. In Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 (920),
it was held that the court might without the consent of the parties, appoint an auditor to ex-
amine books and papers, make computations and hear testimony, whose report shall express
an opinion on the matters in dispute and shall operate as prima facie evidence of the facts.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABROGATE THE GOLD
CLAUSE OF GOVERNMENT BONDS-Plaintiff owned a Fourth Liberty Loan bond,
issued in 1918, which provided for payment of principal and interest in "United
States gold coin of the present standard of value". At that time a dollar in gold
consisted of 25.8 grains .9 fine. By Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,1 Congress
provided that such obligations could be paid in legal tender currency, dollar for
dollar. Later the gold content of the dollar was reduced. 2 On redemption of the
bond plaintiff demanded payment in gold under the old content, or in currency
dollars equal to the number of gold dollars of new content necessary to aggregate
the original quantity of gold. On refusal of defendant to pay more than the face
of the bond in legal tender currency plaintiff brought suit. Held, that Congress
could not abrogate the government's promise to pay according to the "gold
clause", but plaintiff fails to show a cause of action for actual damages. Perry v.
United States, U. S. L. Week, Feb. 19, 1935, at IO (Sup. Ct. 1935).
In emphatic language.the Court denied the power of Congress to invalidate
the government's promise to pay in terms of gold dollars of the standard defined
in the bond.3  This is in contrast to the attitude taken in the suits on private
bonds, where the Court looked on the gold clause in private agreements as subor-
dinate to Congress' power to regulate the value of money.4 Mr. Justice Stone,
in his concurring opinion, questions why this express power cannot be exercised
equally where the sovereign is the debtor.5 However, a justifiable distinction
exists in the fact that while private debtors and creditors can settle their obliga-
tions only in the money provided them by the government, for the latter to take
advantage of its dual position as sovereign and debtor would be repudiation.
Nevertheless, while denying recovery to the plaintiff for failure to show actual
damages,6 the Court leaves open the possibility of further suits, especially by
foreign holders, who can show a real injury through the devaluation of the
dollar7
i. 48 STAT. 112 (933), 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (934).
2. By proclamation the President, on Jan. 31, 1934, fixed the weight of the gold dollar as
15 5/21 grains .9 fine. The power to do this was granted under the Act of May x2, 1933, 48
STAT. 31 (933), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (934).
3. "To say that the Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge [i. e., the terms of
payment] is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no
other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. This Court has given no
sanction to such a conception of the obligations of our government." Instant case at Ix.
4. "There is a clear distinction between the power of Congress to control or interdict the
contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional author-
ity, and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements
when it has borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution confers." Ibid.
5. The argument would seem to be particularly cogent where the sovereign's abrogation
of the gold clause is general, and not merely .for its own benefit.
6. The Court said the plaintiff could not legally have used the promised gold to secure
more than was available to him by the use of the currency paid him, since gold coin was no
longer a medium of exchange. See Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 STAT. 112 (0933),
3i U. S. C. A. § 463 (1934). Furthermore, plaintiff's buying power in the domestic market
(and exportation of gold was severely restricted) was practically unaffected, due to a failure
of commodity prices to rise in proportion to the devaluation of the dollar. For a discussion
of this latter factor in general see (934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 533.
7. Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissenting, called attention to an appropriation of $23,862,750.78
to the Philippine government for losses sustained by the latter, through devaluation of the
dollar, on its deposits in the United States. Similarly $7,438,000 was appropriated to govern-
mental employees stationed in foreign countries, the currencies of the latter appreciating in
terms of the dollar.. Instant case at 17.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF UNITED STATES TO REDEEM GOLD CER-
TIFICATES IN LEGAL TENDER CURRENCY--On January 17, 1934, plaintiff, the
holder of gold certificates, demanded their redemption in gold dollars of 25.8
grains, or one ounce of gold for each $2o.67 of the gold certificates. Payment in
gold was refused,' and under protest plaintiff accepted an amount of legal tender
currency, not payable in gold, equal to the face value of the certificates. Alleging
that the value of gold was $33.43 per ounce at the time demand was made, plain-
tiff sued for the difference between the amount of currency paid him and the
alleged value of the gold he would have received had he been paid in metal. On
demurrer, Held, that plaintiff has no cause of action against the United States.
Nortzv. United States, U. S. L. Week, Feb. 19, 1935, at 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Plaintiff argued that gold certificates were substantially warehouse receipts
for bullion deposited in the Treasury. The Court rejected this theory, properly
it would seem, saying the certificates called for dollars and not bullion.2  Conse-
quently, since Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, made all currencies legal tender,
the government could discharge its obligation by payment in dollars of any cur-
rency. Moreover, even if redemption had been in gold dollars plaintiff would
not have received any additional benefit thereby. As the Court pointed out, there
was no free market for gold, and no "market value" as claimed. By existing
legislation,4 the constitutionality of which plaintiff did not attack, he would imme-
diately have had to return the gold to the Treasury, and, the dollar consisting of
25.8 grains at that time, he would have received an amount of currency exactly
equal to that which he was given. The decision thus turned on. Congress' power
to regulate the use of gold coin as a medium of exchange, and this power, at least
as here questioned, could hardly be denied.5
COURTS-JURISDICTION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL AS RECEIVER
FOR QUAsI-PUBLIC ASSOCIATION DESPITE PRIOR INSTITUTION OF RECEIVERSHIP
PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT-A non-resident shareholder instituted re-
ceivership proceedings against a Pennsylvania insurance company in the federal
district court. Subsequently the state Attorney-General, under statutory author-
ity, obtained a decree in the state court directing the Insurance Commissioner to
i. Executive Order No. 61o2, April 5, 1933, 12 U. S. C. A. § 68 (Supp. 1934), required all
persons to surrender gold coin, bullion or gold certificates to some member bank of the fed-
eral reserve system, the bank to pay in exchange an "equivalent amount of any other form of
coin or currency" of the United States.
:2. Gold certificates, issued under 41 STAT. 370 (919), 31 U. S. C. A. § 451 (1927), had
to be issued in denominations of dollars, and called for payment of dollars. Section 5 of the
Act of 1863, 12 STAT. 711, 31 U. S. C. A. §428 (927), provided for the issuance of gold
certificates in an amount exceeding the gold deposited. This is inconsistent with an intent to
make the gold certificate a mere warehouse receipt. Cf. the interpretation of the gold clause
in the accompanying suits on private bonds. U. S. L. Week, Feb. i9, 1935, at 5, supra this
issue at 682.
3. 48 STAT. 112, 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (1933).
4. Under the authority of § 3 n of the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933, 48
STAT. 2 (i933). 12 U. S. C. A. § 248 (n) (Supp. 1934) the Secretary of the Treasury, on
August 28, 12 U. S. C. A. § 46 (Supp. i934), and again on January 15, 12 U. S. C. A. § 49
(Supp. 1934), ordered all gold coin and gold certificates surrendered and exchanged for
currency equal to the face amount.
5. Cf. Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 F. Supp. i56 (S. D. N. Y. i933). Ling Su
Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302 (i9io), had previously upheld the power to prohibit the
export of coin. See also Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. and United States v. Bankers
Trust Company, U. S. I.. Week, Feb. i9, 1935, at 3, decided at the same time as the instant
case.
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take possession of the assets of the company for liquidation, and enjoining it
from turning over its assets to anyone other than the Commissioner. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order on the ground that the federal
court was without jurisdiction.- Held, that the decree be reversed, without prej-
udice to the right of the Commissioner to apply to the federal court to have the
receivership vacated and the assets turned over to him. Penn General Casualty
Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ex rel. Schnader, U. S. L. Week, Feb. 5,
1935, at 22 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
Upon bill of a non-resident shareholder and with the consent of the associa-
tion, the federal court appointed receivers for a Pennsylvania building and loan
association. The state Secretary of Banking petitioned the court to oust these
receivers and to turn over the assets to him. Held, that the federal court, in
refusing to turn over the assets to the Secretary, had abused its discretion, since
the state had provided a comprehensive system of administrative regulation and
liquidation. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, U. S. L. Week, Feb.
5, 1935, at 20 (Sup. Ct. 1935), rev'g 72 F. (2d) 509 (C-. C. A. 3d, 1934).
These results accord with both legal theory and practical desiderata, as indi-
cated in a discussion of these two cases in a previous issue of this REVIEW. 2 The
Penn Casualty case, of course, requires merely a change in the procedure by
which the Insurance Commissioner may obtain the assets when the federal court
has acted first. The Williams case prevents the emasculation of state administra-
tive regulation through the otherwise ever-present possibility of escape to a fed-
eral equity receivership.
DEATH-RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE WHEN
SOLE BENEFICIARY Is DEFENDANT'S WIFE-Defendant's unmarried daughter
was killed through defendant's negligence. Plaintiff, administrator of decedent's
estate, brought suit under a wrongful death statute.' Decedent had been con-
tributing to the support of her parents, defendant and his wife; therefore they
would normally share the proceeds of such a suit. However, since defendant's
negligence barred him from participating, 2 his wife was the sole beneficiary.
Held (two justices dissenting), that plaintiff can recover, the suit being distin-
guishable from a tort action by the wife against her husband. Albrecht v. Polt-
hoff, 257 N. W. 377 (Minn. I934).
On the theory that husband and wife were one, the common law did not
permit a wife to sue her spouse for personal torts.8 According to the weight of
authority, Married Women's Acts have not abrogated this rule.4 The court dis-
I. Commonwealth ex reL Schnader v. Penn General Casualty Co., 316 Pa. 1, 173 Atl.
637 (1934).
2. (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 272.
I. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9657.
2. The underlying reason for this doctrine is that no one should be permitted to profit by
his own wrongdoing. Smith v. Hestonville, etc., Ry., 92 Pa. 450 (i88o) ; Bamberger v. Citi-
zens' Street Ry., 95 Tenn. 18, 31 S. W. 163 (1895).
3. See Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 289, 44 N. E. 462, 463 (1896) ; I ScHouIER,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DO1sESTIc RELATIoNs (6th ed. 1921) § 633.
4. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 61I (I910) ; Peters v. Peters, I56 Cal. 32, 1O3 Pac.
219 (igog); Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. W. 1022 (1922); SCEOULER, 10c.
ct. supra note 3. Contra: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) ; Fielder v.
Fielder, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914). It follows that, under a wrongful death statute,
the personal representative of the wife cannot sue the husband who was responsible for her
death. Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315 (918). Contra: Robin-
son's Adm'r v. Robinson, I88 Ky. 49, 220 S. W. 1074 (1920).
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tinguished the instant case from a suit brought by the wife, on the ground that
the wife was not a party, and could not be, under the statute.5  This attitude
stresses form at the expense of substance. The cause of action belongs to the
beneficiary, since the wrongful death was an injury to her interests.' On this
principle, the sole beneficiary may assign her claim, 7 or may release defendant
from liability.8 Only the right to sue is vested in decedent's personal representa-
tive, who is regarded as a mere trustee of the proceeds. 9 The conclusion is ines-
capable that defendant's wife, to all intents and purposes, was here bringing suit
against her husband."' It is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of estrange-
ment between spouses, or of liability insurance to protect defendant, actions such
as this probably will not arise. In fact, defendant and his wife were living to-
gether, and it was extremely likely that defendant would enjoy some of the pro-
ceeds of the judgment. Therefore, if defendant is insured, he may ultimately gain
by being sued. Of course, the very purpose of insurance is to indemnify; yet it
is submitted that, where the husband and wife are living together, to allow recov-
ery opens the door to collusion between them, especially in cases based upon
negligence. The rule of law which prohibits tort actions between spouses has
been generally followed," and although sometimes attacked as archaic,' 2 seems to
embody a desirable public policy when wisely applied.' 3
EQUITY-DECREE AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF-AWARD OF DAMAGES ON
DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE RELiEF-Defendant railroad company removed two
bridges carrying a public highway, in which the complainant had easements, over
its tracks. Defendant in good faith believed it owned the easements under a con-
veyance from the city of New York, and the restoration cost would have greatly
exceeded the value of the rights invaded. Complainant sought a mandatory
injunction against disturbance of the easements, with damages to time of trial.
Held (two justices dissenting), that upon denial of the injunction equity might
direct that in exchange for his property rights complainant should have judgment
for damages to the value of the property. Cox v. New York Central R. R., 265
N. Y. 411 (1934).
5. The statute requires the action to be brought in the name of decedent's personal rep-
resentative.
6. See Murphy v. St Louis, etc., Ry., 92 Ark. 159, 163, 122 S. W. 636, 638 (19o9);
Sykora v. Case Threshing-Machine Co., 59 Minn. 130, 132, 6o N. V. iooS (1894). Thus, the
damages are measured by the pecuniary loss resulting to the beneficiaries from the death.
See Murphy v. St Louis, etc., Ry., 92 Ark. i59, 163, 122 S. W. 636, 638 (19o9) ; TIFFANY,
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2d ed. 1913) § 153. And unless there are surviving beneficiaries,
no action will lie. Schwarz v. Judd, 28 Minn. 371, 1O N. W. 2o8 (1881); Woodward v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 23 Wis. 400 (1868) ; see Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410, 414
(I868) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, § So.
7. Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432 (857).
8. Sykora v. Case Threshing-Machine Co., 59 Minn. 13o, 6o N. W. iooS (1894) ; Stueb-
ing v. Marshall, io Daly 4o6 (N. Y. 1882) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 6, § 125.
9. Kober's Estate, 17 Dist. 184 (Pa. 1907) ; Woodward v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,
23 Vis. 40 (1868) ; see Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. R., 205 Pa. 264, 270, 54 Atl. go6, 908
(1903).
io. Cf. Woodward v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 23 Wis. 400 (1868).
ii. See cases cited supra note 4.
12. See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 48, 89 Atl. 889, 89x (1914); Note (1925) 38
HARV. L. REv. 383.
13. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 HAiv. L. REv.
1030, 1054.
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Since Lord Cairns' Act 1 English chancery courts have had jurisdiction to
award damages in lieu of an injunction. 2 New York at an early date practically
incorporated this statute into its legal system by judicial legislation.- Without
attempting to justify such an adoption, the doctrine was consistently applied when
complainant landowners sought to restrain interference with easements or contin-
uance of trespasses by defendant railroads. 4 In order to prevent multiplicity of
actions, equity, on assuming jurisdiction and finding a violation of complainant's
property rights, treated the matter as substantially equivalent to condemnation
proceedings. 5 (There was of course the practical difference that in one case the
railroad was the moving party and in the other the landowner.) Relief was con-
ditional, the decree providing, in effect, that if conveyance was tendered no in-
junction should issue unless defendant refused to pay the sum awarded; and in
the event of complainant's refusal to tender conveyance, operation of the injunc-
tion was suspended until condemnation proceedings could be begun.6 An early
dictum indicated that a railroad would not be justified in refusing to pay and
submitting to an injunction, since this would unduly prejudice the public interest."
In view of New York precedent, no fault can be found with the result of the
instant case. The wisdom of the method of affording relief is, however, decidedly
questionable. Decent regard for precedent compels recognition of the fact that
equity traditionally has either awarded the relief requested or dismissed the bill.
In form at least, it has frowned upon attempts to force complainants to accept
what they did not seek. Under the holding of the instant court, however, a com-
plainant seeking to restrain violation of his rights in property subject to con-
demnation is necessarily an involuntary mover of proceedings against himself to
condemn that property.
LIFE INSURANcE-RISKS AND CAUSES OF LosS-VIOLATION OF LAW BY
INSURED--A life insurance policy provided for double indemnity in case of acci-
dental death unless "caused or attributed to as the result, directly or indirectly, of
any violation of law by the insured". Insured was convicted of a felony and
died of burns received while serving sentence in the penitentiary. Beneficiary
brought suit for double indemnity on the policy. Held, that there could be no
i. 21 & 22 VICr., c. 27, § 2 (1858). "In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has
Jurisdiction to entertain an Application for an Injunction against a Breach of any Covenant,
Contract, or Agreement, or against the Commission or Continuance of any wrongful Act, or
for the specific Performance of any Covenant, Contract, or Agreement, it shall be lawful for
the same Court if it shall think fit, to award Damages to the Party injured, either in addition
to or in substitution for such Injunction or specific Performance, and such Damages may be
assessed in such Manner as the Court shall direct."
2. This enactment was repealed by 46 & 47 VICr., c. 49 (1883), but the jurisdiction con-
ferred by it was preserved by the proviso contained in § 5 of the Act of 1883; § 5 of the
Act of 1883 was itself repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act (61 & 62 VICT., c. 22, 1898)
but the proviso in § I of the latter Act still kept alive the jurisdiction under § 2 of the Act of
i858. The Act of 1883 was repealed by the JUDICATURE ACT, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49 (925).
3. Henderson v. New York Central R. R., 78 N. Y. 423 (1879), which first stated the
doctrine, approvingly cited cases decided under the English statute.
4. Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry., 122 N. Y. I, 25 N. E. 496 (189o); Gray v. Manhattan
Ry., 128 N. Y. 499, 28 N. E. 498 (189).
5. See American Bank Note Co. v. New York Elevated R. R., 129 N. Y. 252, 270, 29 N.
E. 302, 3o6 (i89i) ; O'Reilly v. New York Elevated R. R., 148 N. Y. 347, 357, 42 N. E. 1o63.
io65 (1896).
6. Henderson v. New York Central R. R., 78 N. Y. 423 (1879).
7. Pappenheim v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 128 N. Y. 436, 444, 28 N. E. 518, 519
(1891).
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recovery on the policy since the violation of law was the indirect cause of death.
Runyon v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 192 N. E. 882 (Ohio App. 1934).
Clauses in policies exempting insurance companies from liability for death
or injury resulting from war ' or violation of law have been held ineffective as
defenses unless it be shown that the prohibited act of the insured placed an added
risk upon the insurance company, 2 and that the injury or death resulted because
of the added risk.3 There must be some causal connection between the cause of
death and the excepted risk 4 even where-as in the instant case-the policy stipu-
lates that insurer shall incur no liability for the indirect results of the risk.5 It
is not enough to avoid liability that the violation of law or connection with war
afford the mere occasion or condition of the death or injury.6 In the instant case
the court concluded properly that the inclusion in the policy of the word "indi-
rect" excluded the application of the theory of "proximate" cause; but in holding
that the violation of law by the insured was even the indirect cause of death it
went beyond the limits of causation. The immediate cause of death-the fire--
was in no way connected with the violation of law, but was an independent super-
seding force. The normal interpretation of a clause exempting the insurer from
liability upon certain contingencies is that the company is unwilling to subject
itself to the added risks normally attendant upon such circumstances.7 A broader
intent cannot be assumed since the policy must be construed most strictly against
the insurer." Assured's imprisonment for violating the law places no added risk
upon the insurer, so injuries incidentally dependent upon such imprisonment are
not among the risks excepted by the terms of the policy. The case of Coxe v.
Employers' Liability Ass'n Corp.,9 relied on by the court, is clearly distinguish-
able, since in that case assured's connection with war placed him in a position of
special danger, and death resulted from such danger.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-TERMINATION-DUTY OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL
AFTER TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSYIP-X employed plaintiff, a firm of
real estate brokers, as one of several agents to negotiate the sale of a leasehold.
Defendant, plaintiff's employee, initiated negotiations with Y, a prospective pur-
chaser. Because of a disagreement in good faith over a matter not connected with
the sale of the leasehold, defendant withdrew from plaintiff's employment before
the sale was consummated. Defendant was then engaged by X as an independent
broker, completed the sale, and obtained judgment for his commission. Plaintiff,
i. For a collection of the cases on this allied topic, see Note (ig2i) II A. L. R. 1103;
Cohen, The War Clmse in Life Insurance Policies (192I) 21 CoL L. REv. 35.
2. Conboy v. Ry. Officials' and Employes' Acc. Ass'n, 17 Ind. App. 62, 46 N. E. 363
(1897) ; see Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 483 (1884).
3. Supreme Lodge v. Crenshaw, 129 Ga. 195, 58 S. E. 628 (19o7) ; Atkinson v. Indiana
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 194 Ind. 563, 143 N. E. 629 (19,24).
4. Supreme Lodge v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49 (1go') : Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers
Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W. 454 (1gig); 6 COOLEY, BpiEFs oGr INsur~ANcE (2d ed.
1928) 5215.
5. Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 Ga. 653, 115 S. E. 14 (1922).
6. Matthes v. Imperial Acc. Ass'n, 11o Iowa 222, 8I N. W. 484 (igoo); Rowe v.
United Commercial Travelers Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W. 454 (1919).
7. See Flower v. Continental Casualty Co., 140 Iowa 510, 513, 118 N. W. 761, 762
(igoS) ; Kelly v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 169 Wis. 274, 276, 172 N. W.
152, 153 (1919).
8. Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 154 Ga. 653, i15 S. E. 14 (1922).
q. [1916] 2 K. B. 629. The policy contained a condition relieving insurer from liability
if death should be directly or indirectly caused by or traceable to war. Assured was guard-
ing an unlighted railroad at night when he was run over by a train. The beneficiary was
denied recovery on the ground that death was indirectly caused by war.
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who meanwhile had done nothing to further its own interest, thereupon sued for
its share of the commission. Held (two justices dissenting), that plaintiff could
not recover, since after the termination of the agency defendant was free to com-
pete with plaintiff in the transaction in question. Bryne & Bowman v. Barrett,
N. Y. L. J., December 24, 1934 (N. Y. App. Div., xst Dep't).
It is well established that in the absence of a covenant not to compete' the
agent, after leaving his principal's employ, is free to utilize, in competition with
his former employer, the general knowledge and experience he may have acquired
during the employment.' He may also take advantage of the good will and asso-
ciations that he may have built up in the course of his employment.3 On
the other hand it is equally well settled that the agent continues under certain
duties to his principal even after the termination of the relationship. 4  These
include a duty not to disclose trade secrets,5 special processes,6 and information
of a confidential nature.7 Applying these principles to the instant case, it would
seem that the majority of the court was justified in holding that defendant had
violated no duty .to plaintiff. At the time the agency relation was terminated,
plaintiff had no more than a reasonable expectation of completing the sale and
obtaining the commission. And it has been held that such a reasonable expect-
ancy is neither a right nor an asset.8 While a certain degree of protection for
employers against their former employees' disclosure of peculiarly confidential
business information is necessary, 9 any further extension of this protection might
render it virtually impossible for an employee to withdraw from his employer's
service in order to found a business of his own in competition with his former
employer, a socially undesirable result.' 0
TAXATION-INHERITANCE AND TRANSFER TAXEs-SITuS OF INTANGIBLE
PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST WITHIN THE STATE-A resident of North Dakota
had placed in trust in Minnesota sundry notes, securities and bonds. The trustee
i. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); Wilkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61
Misc. 126, 11z N. Y. Supp. 874 (Sup. Ct. I908).
2. "For Equity has no power to compel a man who changes his employers to wipe
clean the slate of his memory." Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review, 147 App. Div.
715, 717, 132 N. Y. Supp. 37, 39 (ist Dep't 1911) ; Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155,
io9 N. W. 483 (906).
3. Proctor v. Mahin, 93 Fed. 875 (N. D. Ill. 1899); Scott & Co. v. Scott, 186 App.
Div. 518, 174 N. Y. Supp. 583 (ist Dep't 19g); Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824,
133 N. Y. Supp. 91o (4th Dep't 1912). See RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) 396 (b).
These same principles have been held to apply even to partnerships, where the duty of
loyalty is much more binding. Lafferty v. Lafferty, 174 Pa. 536, 34 Atl. 203 (i896).
4. RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (0933) 396 (b).
5. Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 R. I. 399, 71 Atl. 8o2 (i9o9) (list of patrons) ; Simmons
Hardware Co. v. Waibel, i S. D. 488, 47 N. W. 814 (i889) (code of price marks);
Merryweather v. Moore (1892) 2 Ch. 518 (patterns). See Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132
Iowa 155, 171, 1O9 N. W. 483, 491 (1906).
6. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 14o (1897) ; Salomon v. Hertz,
4o N. J. Eq. 4o, 2 Atl 379 (1886). Whatever might be termed "unique assets" the law
will protect against disclosure. See RESTATE-MENT, AGENCY (1933) 396 (b).
7. Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 62o (C. C. A. 8th, i9o3) ; Eoff v. Irvine, io8 Mo. 378, 18
S. W. 907 (1892).
8. Stem v. Warren, 227 N. Y. 538, 125 N. W. 81i (Ig2o).
9. A further limitation on the former agent's right to compete is that his withdrawal
must be in good faith. If defendant had deliberately terminated the relation in order to
secure the entire commission for himself, the result would have been different. Sibbold v.
Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 384 (189i).
1o. The fact that plaintiff stood idly by and did nothing to further its own interests in
the hope that if defendant succeeded it would share in his success, while if he failed it would
escape any claim for expenses, may have influenced the court in the instant case.
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had been empowered to collect, reinvest and distribute the income therefrom sub-
ject to the approval of the settlor, who had reserved to himself the income for
life, with power to amend or revoke the trust. Upon the latter's death, the bene-
ficiaries appealed from an order of the Minnesota district Court, imposing an
inheritance tax.' Held (on reargument), "that North Dakota has the sole right
to tax the transfer here in question". In re Frank's Estate, 257 N. W. 330
(Minn. 1934).
When intangibles owned by a non-resident have been employed by an
agent in transactions within a state, taxes levied by such state have frequently
been upheld by its courts on the ground that the intangibles had acquired
a "business situs" for taxation.2 A recent line of United States Supreme
Court decisions, however, has increasingly delimited the right of a state other
than that of domicile to levy a tax upon intangibles.3 The Court has held, for
example, that a state may not tax shares of a domestic corporation, 4 or even its
own public bonds,5 when these are owned by a non-resident. At the same time,
the Court has expressly reserved the question whether the state of "business
situs" may tax, in addition to or in place of the state of domicile.6 As to what
factors are required to constitute a business situs, no definitive formula yet exists.
7
But it has generally been held that the intangibles must at any rate be in the state
more or less permanently,8 and that the resident agent must exercise a consider-
able amount of control over themY On the basis of such criteria, courts have
sustained taxes in fact-situations similar to that in the instant case, a resident
agent or trustee having power to collect and reinvest.' 0 Therefore in holding
that no business situs existed in Minnesota, the instant court apparently departed
from the weight of authority. The court, however, stressed the fact that the
subject of the tax in question was not the property, but the succession or transfer
thereof." The distinction has not infrequently been noted, 2 but it seems not to
i. Trusts of this type have generally been held testamentary. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240
U. S. 625 (1916) ; RESTATnmENT, TRUSTS (1929) §§ 63, 64; Runk, Differing Federal and
State Interpretations of the Transfer Inheritance Tax Applied to Trusts Inter Vivos (193o)
79 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 185; Note (934) 43 YALE L. J. 491.
2. City of New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899) ; Bristol v. Washington County,
177 U. S. 133 (19oo) ; Safe Deposit Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929) ; Hall v. Miller,
io2 Tex. 289, 115 S. W. 1168 (ioS).
3. It seems not unlikely that the Court will ultimately hold taxation of the same prop-
erty by more than one state contrary to the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment. See
dissents of Justices Holmes and Stone (Justice Brandeis joining), in Safe Deposit Co. v.
Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 96 (1929) ; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
218; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 333 (1932) ; Brown, Multiple Taxa-
tlion by the States-What Is Left of It? (935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 407.
4. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
5. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (1930).
6. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra, at 213. But see Brown, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 428.
7. For a full discussion of the confusion inherent in earlier Supreme Court rulings on the
subject, see Powell, The Business Situs of Credits (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89. For a gen-
cral consideration of the factors constituting a "business situs" in state courts, see Brown,
Multiple Taxation by the States-What Is Left of It? (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 407, 420;
(1935) 29 uL. L. REv. 678.
8. Hinckley v. San Diego County, 49 Cal. App. 668, 194 Pac. 77 (192o) ; see Bristol v.
Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 142 (19oo). But cf. In re Romaine's Estate, 127 N. Y.
80, 27 N. E. 759 (189).
9. Reat v. People, 201 Ill. 469, 66 N. E. 242 (19o3) ; Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472
(877) ; Commissioners v. Green, 15o Ky. 339, 150 S. W. 353 (912).
lO. See cases cited note 2, supra.
i. See instant case at 335, quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312,
330 (1932). "'. . . death duties rest upon the power of the state imposing them to control
the privilege of succession', and that, naturally, is the state of the domicile of the deceased."
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have influenced previous decisions." In permitting its determination of the tax-
ing situs to turn largely upon the type of tax involved, the instant court produced
a rather unique holding which is not likely to represent the ultimate rule.
14
UNFAIR COMPETITION-RIGHT OF NEWS AGENCY TO ENJOIN BROADCAST
OF PUBLISHED NEws-Defendant radio station broadcast three extensive news
programs daily, made up of items taken from newspapers which were members
of the complainant news agency. Complainant sought to enjoin these broadcasts
on the theory bf unfair competition. Held, that complainant was not entitled to an
injunction.' Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Dec. 25, 1934, at
Io (W. D. Wash. 1934).
There can be no question that the copyright given by the common law to
unpublished literary efforts was no foundation for complainant's case, since the
very aim of its business is publication. 2 But that some "property" in published
news still remains in a news agency was enunciated in the leading case of Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press,3 which held that, as against a com-
peting news agency gratuitously appropriating news, injunctive relief would be
granted. The instant case was distinguished largely on the ground of lack of
competition between radio and press.' But an analysis of the profit sources of
these instrumentalities 5 and the unfavorable attitude of the press toward radio
news broadcasts 6 makes such a distinction untenable. On the other hand, the
usual case of unfair competition involves the element-absent in the instant case
12. See Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 408 (1907): "Cases arising under collateral in-
heritance tax or succession tax acts have been cited. . . . The foundation upon which such
acts rest is different from that which exists where the assessment is levied on property . . .
and therefore the decisions arising under such inheritance tax cases are not in point." Cf.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (196o) ; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (19o3).
13. See Powell, The Business Situs of Credits (922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89, 102, n.:
"Notwithstanding this explicit assertion (in Buck v. Beach, supra note 12), other Justices of
the Supreme Court from time to time cite inheritance tax cases as though they applied of
their own force to property taxes." In the case of tangible personalty, the Supreme Court has
recently held that an inheritance tax (like a property tax) was properly levied by the state
of physical situs. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 55 Sup. Ct. 29 (0934), (1935)
83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 389.
14. See Harrow, Relation of Jurisdictional Limitations on Power to Tax- to Conflict of
Laws in Decedents' Estates (1934) 2o A. B. A. J. 116, m18: ". . . the courts will probably
. . . consider property that has become part of a business situs in the same category as
tangible personalty, thus limiting the taxation of property that has acquired a business situs
to the state of such situs."
I. For a recent case granting a preliminary injunction on the same facts, see Asso-
ciated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n (D. S. D.), decided March 14, 3933, N. Y.
Times, March 15, 1933, at 13.
2. D'Ole v. Kansas City Star Co., 94 Fed. 840 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1899); DEWois,
AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW (1925) 29; cf. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 385.
3. 248 U. S. 215 (ii8), Note (i939) 67 U. OF PA. L. REV. 191.
4. Another basis offered by the court for distinguishing the cases was that newspapers
are charged for, while radio news is gratuitously disseminated. But this distinction seems
weak in view of the well-known fact that both radio and press depend ultimately on
advertising for the profits of their businesses.
5. See supra note 4.
6. N. Y. Times, April 25, 1933, 1, at 1i. Whether the apprehension of the press with
regard to the harm done by radio news is justified has been questioned on the ground that
although the market for newspapers is reduced by the ready dissemination of news over the
air, the broadcasts of snatches of news may well stimulate a lethargic public into buying
newspapers. See Note (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 1171, at 1175. On the history of the strife
between radio and press see Keating, Pirates of the Air (Sept. 1934) 169 HARPERS 463.
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-of "passing off" one's wares as another's for the purpose of deceiving the
public, thereby appropriating the value of the advertising and the goodwill of the
imitated product.7 Equity has been reluctant to interfere in business dealing
otherwise fair, where the only "unfair" element consisted in some frank appro-
priation of complainant's efforts, with no attempt to deceive the public-such as
the publication of a song made popular by complainant," or the copying of a mer-
chantable pattern.9 This reluctance is probably motivated by the realization that
any check on the free use of the ideas of another is by that much a curb on human
progress.10 An analogous attitude is expressed in the instant case, in which the
court emphasized the public interest in the rapid dissemination of news. At the
same time, an injunction against such broadcasts seems indicated in a proper
case, where because of the wholesale appropriation of the news, circulation may
be so cut down as to discourage efficient newsgathering, in which the interest of
the public should be paramount."-
UNITED STATES-NATURE OF SENATE'S POWER TO ARREST FOR CONTEMPT
-Petitioner, a witness before a Senatorial investigating committee, was required
by subpcena duces tecu-n to produce certain documents. After service of the
subpcena, petitioner permitted a third party to remove from his files several of
the papers subject to the subpcena. These papers were subsequently placed in
the hands of the committee by the party removing them. A citation was then
served on petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
of the Senate. Upon petitioner's failure to appear, the Senate ordered his arrest
by the sergeant at arms, the respondent. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus. Held, that the writ be denied, since the acts committed were of a nature
to obstruct performance of the duties of the legislature, and it is immaterial that
subsequent events rendered the acts harmless. urney v. MacCracken, U. S. L.
Week, Feb. 5, 1935, at 25 (Sup. Ct. 1935), rev'g 72 F. (2d) 560 (App. D. C.
(1934).
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, has broadened the concept of the Senate's power to
commit for contempt. As indicated in the discussion of the latter court's opinion
in an earlier issue of this REVIEW,'1 the present result seems a logical and desir-
able recognition of the underlying basis for the power of a legislative body to
cite for contempt-the necessity for compelling attendance of witnesses and pro-
duction of documents in the investigation of matters relevant to proposed legis-
lation.
7. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (877) at 251. The analogous head of Equity
jurisdiction in England is called "Passing off". See Nims, UNFAIR ComPETrrTI AND
TRADE MARKS (3d ed. 1929) § I; International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U. S. 215, 258 (i9r8), dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis.
8. Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music Publishing Co., 259 N. Y.86, 181 N. E. 57 (1932).
9. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
io. For an expansion of this idea and a vigorous criticism on this basis of the principle
laid down in the International News Service case, supra, see Note (i1) 13 ILL. L. REv.
7o8. ". . . the world as now constituted must continue on a basis of mitigated piracy."
Id. at 719. That the case has not done away with the necessity for the element of "passing
off" in the ordinary case of unfair competition, see Crump Co. v. Lindsay, 130 Va. 144, io7
S. E. 679 (1921).
ii. Such a situation might well grow out of the instant case, where the sum of the
time used in news broadcasts was about two and one-half hours daily; so that almost com-
plete fulfillment of the function of the newspaper was available to listeners. There can be
no doubt that where news is of great public interest (e. g., election returns) the greater
flexibility of radio in issuing bulletins is an advantage which cuts into newspaper circulation.
1. (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 391.
